THE TENTH MAN : 88



Who Are You?


Who are you?
What I am is absence.

Absence of what?
Absence of myself.

So that absence, that kind of absence, is what you are?
No. What I am is total absence.

What do you mean by total absence?
Absence of the notion or cognition of absence-of-myself.

Why so?
Because cognition of my absence would imply presence of the cognition of my non-absence - which is not what-I-am.

So that you are then still present?
So that there would still remain 'myself' to be present or to be absent.

What, then, is your total absence?
Absence of the presence of absence-of-myself.

And who is there to cognise that?
There being nothing to be cognised, there cannot be a cogniser.

And yet there is that cognition so expressed.
There was a cognising, but no cogniser and no cognition cognised. Can you cognise that?

I can, but who, then, am I to do it?
Y o u are not at all, either. It is on account of total absence of absence that cognising can appear to occur. If there were any presence, even of absence, there could not be any cognising, or any phenomenon soever, for only out of absence as such can presence seem to be.

So that the Absolute, Tao, Buddha-mind, Godhead, Suchness, etc. are all one and all just absence?
Each necessarily implies Absolute Absence, utter absence of absence as of presence, which is why anything at all can appear to exist.

Concepts, then, all concepts are total absence? But are the conceivers of concepts total absence also?
The conceivers of concepts are 'themselves' concepts, and nothing whatever but concepts.

So that total absence implies total absence of conceptuality?
Which necessarily requires the total absence of a conceiver of concepts.

Which I am?
Which you are not.

Which, as what-I-am, I neither am nor am not?
Yes, because the conceived is just the conceiver, and the conceiver is just the conceived.

Which objectively is no 'thing'?
Because subjectively it is no 'thing'.

So that is all that can be said?
What need could there be to say anything? The obvious needs no saying.

So that utter absence is obvious?
The utter absence of the source of conceptuality which is what all appearance is, is surely obvious? Patent, evident, inevitable?

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And I am that?
What you are can only be such and, being such, you are not.

And such is all that 'things' are, or can be said to be?
Is that not the final truth concerning what is neither true nor untrue, since no 'thing', true or untrue, has ever been or ever will be?

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Note: Phenomenally regarded, what I am is totally absent as appearance, since it is noumenal, and an absence comports also the absence of the subject of the absent object. Therefore my only presence is as all objective phenomena as such.

But, 'noumenally regarded', what I am can neither be present nor absent, since nothing can have conceptual existence therein and so could not be cognised as either. But since noumenon cannot manifest directly as absence, direct noumenal manifestation must necessarily appear to be positive - and then it is presence, not a sensorially perceptible presence such as that of objective phenomena, but an immanent presence, ubiquitous and intemporal, total and absolute; and what-I-am, though phenomenally absent, is nevertheless absolute Presence.

It follows that total phenomenal absence is absolute noumenal presence, which is 'what-you-are'. And what is termed 'enlightenment' therefore, is living as what-you-are.


(© HKU Press, 1966)
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